In 1869, Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase handed down what appeared to be a definitive ruling against state independence in Texas v. White, declaring that Texas had never left the Union because the United States was an “indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.” This case has been used ever since to declare any discussion of Texas independence as settled law. However, Chase’s ruling contains a fatal flaw that has been largely overlooked – if his legal reasoning was correct, then George Washington’s first term as President was illegitimate and every law passed during that period was void.

This stunning conclusion emerges from Chase’s central argument that the Articles of Confederation were never actually replaced by the Constitution but instead continued to provide an underlying legal framework for the Union. The Articles required unanimous consent of all 13 states for any alterations to take effect. Yet Rhode Island did not ratify the Constitution until May 29, 1790, nearly halfway through Washington’s first term. If Chase was right about the Articles’ continuing authority, then the Constitution could not have legally taken effect until Rhode Island’s ratification – meaning Washington’s election, inauguration, and every law he signed before that date was constitutionally invalid.

This is not merely an academic argument. It exposes the fundamental problems with using Texas v. White to deny Texas’s right to chart its own political future. The Supreme Court’s attempt to retroactively justify the Civil War by declaring states could never leave the Union created impossible logical paradoxes that undermine the very foundations of American constitutional history. We are left with only two choices: either Texas v. White was wrongly decided, or we must accept that the first years of the American republic, including the establishment of the federal judiciary itself, were legally void.

For Texans seeking to understand their right of self-determination, this matters deeply. The primary legal barrier cited against Texas independence is built on logical quicksand. Rather than being bound by flawed 19th century precedent, Texans can and should evaluate their political future based on modern principles of self-determination and democratic consent. The choice is clear: we can either cling to inherently contradictory Supreme Court decisions from the Reconstruction era, or we can embrace the fundamental right of peoples to determine their own political destiny.

Let’s examine exactly how the Supreme Court’s attempt to deny state sovereignty went so wrong, and why its reasoning has no bearing on Texas’s right to independence in the 21st century.

The Constitutional Convention and the Articles of Confederation

The foundational flaw in Texas v. White stems from a failure to properly understand the legal relationship between the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution. To expose this error, we must examine the actual historical record of how the United States transitioned between these two governing documents.

The Articles of Confederation, ratified in 1781, contained a critical provision in Article XIII that would later create an insurmountable problem for Chase’s reasoning:

“The Articles of this confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State, and the union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of them; unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State.”

This unanimity requirement – that any changes must be approved by all 13 state legislatures – was absolute. The Articles provided no alternative method for amendment or alteration. This became a major source of frustration as the Articles’ weaknesses became apparent, with single states able to block needed reforms.

When delegates gathered in Philadelphia in 1787, they were officially tasked only with proposing amendments to the Articles. However, they quickly concluded that the entire system needed to be replaced. Rather than follow the Articles’ amendment process, they made two crucial decisions that fundamentally broke from the existing legal framework:

1. The Constitution would be ratified by special state conventions rather than state legislatures
2. The Constitution would take effect once nine states ratified it, rather than requiring unanimity

This was a clean break from the Articles’ legal authority. As James Madison noted in Federalist No. 40, the Convention had to choose between following the Articles’ prescribed process and actually creating an effective government. They chose the latter, essentially engaging in what scholars have called a peaceful revolution.

The problems this created became evident during the ratification process. While nine states quickly ratified the Constitution, North Carolina and Rhode Island strongly resisted. Rhode Island was particularly opposed, having refused to even send delegates to the Constitutional Convention. Between 1787 and 1790, Rhode Island attempted ratification eleven times without success.

Meanwhile, the new federal government began operating after nine states ratified, holding elections and inaugurating George Washington as president in 1789. Congress took a carrot-and-stick approach to the holdout states. They were still allowed to send delegates to Congress under the Articles, but were increasingly threatened with being treated as foreign nations subject to trade restrictions.

Rhode Island finally succumbed to this pressure and ratified the Constitution on May 29, 1790, by the narrowest of margins – 34-32. This was nearly halfway through Washington’s first term as president.

This timeline creates an irreconcilable problem for Chase’s reasoning in Texas v. White. If, as he claimed, the Articles of Confederation remained legally binding and created a perpetual union that the Constitution merely “perfected,” then the Constitution could not have legally taken effect until all 13 states ratified it. The Articles’ unanimity requirement would still have controlled.

Yet the federal government clearly operated before Rhode Island’s ratification, passing major legislation including:

• The Judiciary Act of 1789
• The First Bank of the United States
• The creation of the U.S. Mint
• The First Tariff Act

Under Chase’s logic, all of these acts were void, as was Washington’s election itself. This is clearly an untenable conclusion that no serious scholar would accept.

The Logical Trap of Texas v White

Chief Justice Chase’s opinion in Texas v White rests on a peculiar theory about the nature of the American Union – one that creates impossible contradictions when examined closely. At the heart of his opinion is this key passage:

“The Union of the States never was a purely artificial and arbitrary relation… it began among the Colonies… it was confirmed and strengthened by the necessities of war, and received definite form, and character, and sanction from the Articles of Confederation. By these, the Union was solemnly declared to ‘be perpetual.’ And when these Articles were found to be inadequate to the exigencies of the country, the Constitution was ordained ‘to form a more perfect Union.'”

This poetic language masks serious logical flaws. Chase argues that:

1. An informal “Union” predated any legal documents
2. This Union was given “definite form” by the Articles of Confederation
3. The Constitution merely “perfected” this existing perpetual Union rather than creating a new framework

The problems with this reasoning are profound. First, Chase’s mystical pre-constitutional “Union” has no basis in law. The colonies were separate political entities that coordinated resistance to British rule but maintained their individual sovereignty. Even the Declaration of Independence refers to “these United Colonies” as “Free and Independent States” with “full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do.”

More importantly, Chase’s insistence that the Articles of Confederation remained legally relevant creates an unsolvable paradox. If the Articles’ declaration of perpetual union remained binding, then their amendment procedures must also have remained binding. Article XIII explicitly required unanimous consent of all state legislatures for any alterations.

This leads us to what we might call the “Washington Paradox”:

1. If the Articles remained legally binding as Chase claims, then the Constitution could not take effect until all 13 states ratified it
2. Rhode Island did not ratify until May 29, 1790
3. Therefore, all federal government actions before that date were legally void
4. This includes Washington’s election, inauguration, and every law passed in 1789-90

Chase never addresses this fatal flaw in his reasoning. He cannot have it both ways – either the Articles were fully superseded by the Constitution (in which case their “perpetual union” language carries no legal weight), or they remained binding (in which case the federal government operated illegally for its first year).

The absurdity of this result exposes the fundamental weakness of Chase’s entire theory. He was engaging in results-oriented jurisprudence, working backward from his desired conclusion (that secession was illegal) rather than following legal principles to their logical conclusion.

This matters because Chase’s opinion has been used for over 150 years to deny states their fundamental right of self-determination. Yet his reasoning collapses under its own weight. If accepting Texas v White as valid means declaring George Washington’s presidency illegitimate, then clearly something is wrong with the Court’s logic.

The Historical Context of Texas v White

To fully understand why Texas v White has no legitimate bearing on Texas independence, we must examine the political context in which it was decided. The case was heard in 1869, at the height of Reconstruction, when the federal government was systematically stripping Southern states of their autonomy and sovereignty. The timing is crucial – this wasn’t a dispassionate analysis of constitutional law, but rather a politically motivated attempt to retroactively justify the Civil War and the federal government’s expansive claims of power.

The actual facts of the case had nothing to do with secession or state sovereignty. The dispute centered on bonds that were sold by the Confederate state government of Texas during the Civil War. After the war, the Reconstruction government of Texas sued to recover these bonds, arguing they had been illegally sold. The only reason the Court addressed secession at all was to determine whether Texas had standing to bring the suit, since it had not yet been readmitted to the Union.

Chief Justice Chase’s background is particularly relevant. Before joining the Court, he had served as Lincoln’s Treasury Secretary during the Civil War. He was a strong nationalist who had helped expand federal power to unprecedented levels during the conflict. His opinion in Texas v White reads more like a political manifesto justifying those wartime actions than a careful constitutional analysis.

Consider how Chase approached the central question. Rather than examining the Constitution’s text, the debates surrounding its ratification, or the understanding of the founding generation, he invented a mystical pre-constitutional “Union” that supposedly emerged organically from “mutual sympathies” and “kindred principles.” This is the language of romantic nationalism, not constitutional law.

Chase was not writing on a blank slate. He was well aware that many of the Constitution’s framers and ratifiers had explicitly understood states to retain their ultimate sovereignty:

• Virginia’s ratification document explicitly reserved its right to “resume” delegated powers
• The Constitution was ratified by state conventions rather than a national vote specifically because states were understood to be sovereign
• Even Alexander Hamilton, a strong nationalist, acknowledged in Federalist 81 that states retained their sovereign immunity

Yet Chase ignored all of this historical evidence because it didn’t serve his political purpose. His goal was not to interpret the Constitution but to ensure that no state could ever again challenge federal supremacy.

The weakness of Chase’s reasoning becomes even clearer when we examine how he dealt with Rhode Island’s late ratification. The historical record shows that the first federal government treated Rhode Island as a foreign nation, threatening it with trade restrictions if it didn’t join the Union. This makes no sense if Chase was right that Rhode Island was already bound by a perpetual Union it could never leave. The early federal government’s actions only make sense if they understood that states retained their ultimate sovereignty and could choose whether to join or remain outside the new Union.

This historical context matters because it exposes Texas v White for what it was – a political decision designed to validate the massive expansion of federal power that occurred during and after the Civil War. It was never intended to be a careful analysis of states’ constitutional rights, and it should not be treated as binding precedent on the question of Texas independence.

Why Texas v White Has No Bearing on Modern Texit

The fundamental weakness of relying on Texas v White to oppose Texas independence becomes even clearer when we examine how dramatically the legal and political context has changed since 1869. The world has witnessed a revolution in international law and the understanding of self-determination over the past 150 years. Using a Reconstruction-era Supreme Court case to deny Texas’s right to chart its own political future is like using 19th-century precedents to deny women’s suffrage or civil rights.

The Century of Self-Determination

The principle of self-determination – that peoples have the right to freely determine their political status – has become a cornerstone of international law and relations. Consider these developments since Texas v White was decided:

• At the end of World War II, there were only 54 internationally recognized countries
• By 1973, that number had grown to approximately 120
• Today there are 195 recognized nations, with dozens more seeking recognition

This explosion in the number of independent nations wasn’t accidental. It reflects a fundamental shift in how the international community views political sovereignty. The right of self-determination has been enshrined in:

• The United Nations Charter
• The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
• Numerous UN General Assembly resolutions
• Multiple international court decisions

The United States itself has been one of the strongest advocates for self-determination around the world. It has:

• Supported the independence of numerous former colonies
• Recognized the right of Soviet republics to leave the USSR
• Championed the independence of Kosovo from Serbia
• Consistently advocated for the right of peoples to determine their own political status

The Irrelevance of 19th Century Precedent

Given this dramatic evolution in legal principles, relying on Texas v White to deny Texas independence is fundamentally anachronistic. The case was decided:

• Before women had the right to vote
• Before the modern concept of human rights emerged
• Before the principle of self-determination was recognized in international law
• Before the United States became a champion of democratic self-governance

Even if we accept Chase’s flawed reasoning about the nature of the American Union in 1869 (which we shouldn’t), that tells us nothing about Texas’s right to self-determination in the 21st century. Legal principles evolve as societies progress. Just as we would never accept Dred Scott or Plessy v Ferguson as controlling precedent on civil rights today, we should not accept Texas v White as controlling on the question of self-determination.

Texas’s Right to Choose

The modern case for Texas independence rests not on 19th-century American constitutional law but on fundamental principles of democratic governance and self-determination. Texas meets all the criteria for a viable independent nation:

• A distinct political and cultural identity
• A robust economy (8th largest in the world)
• The ability to defend its territory
• Democratic institutions and the rule of law
• A well-defined territory and population

Most importantly, Texas has what every successful independence movement needs – a population increasingly convinced that their interests would be better served by self-government than by remaining part of a larger political union.

The question of Texas independence should be decided by Texans through democratic means, not by tortured readings of Civil War-era court decisions. The principles of self-determination recognized by modern international law provide a much more relevant framework than Chase’s flawed opinion from 1869.

The Path Forward

The central irony of Texas v White is that it has become a barrier to legitimate democratic discourse about Texas’s political future by virtue of a legal theory that, if taken seriously, would invalidate the first years of the American republic itself. We are left with an inescapable choice: either Texas v White was wrongly decided, or George Washington was never legitimately president. There is no logically consistent middle ground.

This presents an opportunity for supporters of Texas independence to reframe the debate. Rather than engaging in technical arguments about 19th-century constitutional law, we should focus on the fundamental question: Do Texans have the right to determine their own political future through democratic means?

The answer, based on universally recognized principles of self-determination, is unequivocally yes. Consider:

• If Texas were already an independent nation, would anyone suggest it had no right to remain independent?
• If Texas were voting today on whether to join the United States, would anyone argue it had no choice but to join?
• Why then should Texas be denied the right to reconsider its political status through peaceful, democratic means?

The path forward is clear. Texas independence should be decided not by Civil War-era court decisions but by the will of the Texas people expressed through legitimate democratic processes. This means:

1. Recognizing that Texas v White, with its logical impossibilities and outdated reasoning, has no bearing on Texas’s right of self-determination in the 21st century
2. Acknowledging that the question of Texas independence should be settled by Texans through the ballot box, not by federal courts citing precedents from an era before women could vote
3. Focusing the debate on the merits of independence – whether Texans would be better served by self-government than by remaining in an increasingly dysfunctional federal system

The fundamental weakness of Texas v White – that it creates an impossible paradox regarding the founding of the American Republic itself – helps illuminate why it should have no bearing on Texas’s future. Just as the American founders recognized their right to chart a new political course despite legal arguments supporting British rule, Texans today have the right to evaluate their political future based on current realities rather than flawed historical precedents.

The question facing Texas is not whether we are forever bound by a Supreme Court’s attempt to retroactively justify the Civil War. The question is whether Texans, like every other people on Earth, have the fundamental right to determine their own political destiny through peaceful, democratic means.

The answer to that question will be written not by 19th-century justices but by current and future generations of Texans who understand that self-determination is not just a legal right but a moral imperative. The time has come to move past outdated precedents and engage in a real debate about Texas’s future.

Let Texas vote.